Dialetheism

Dialetheism, a philosophical stance that challenges the sacrosanct law of non-contradiction, has emerged as a provocative and divisive theory in contemporary logic and metaphysics. This radical doctrine posits the existence of true contradictions, statements or propositions for which both the proposition and its negation hold simultaneously. While this notion defies the foundational principles of classical logic, its proponents argue that dialetheism offers a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of truth, language, and the nature of reality itself.

The Origins of Dialetheism: Ancient Eastern Antecedents

Though the explicit formulation of dialetheism as a distinct philosophical position is a relatively modern development, its conceptual seeds can be traced back to certain strands of ancient Eastern thought. In particular, the Buddhist philosophical traditions, influenced by the concept of ??nyat? (emptiness or essencelessness), entertained the idea that apparent contradictions or paradoxical statements could be reconciled and transcended through a higher level of understanding.

One of the earliest examples of dialetheic reasoning can be found in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, a seminal text of the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism, authored by the 2nd-century philosopher Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna employed a style of reasoning known as the “catuṣkoṭi” or “tetralemma,” which involved analyzing a proposition from four perspectives: affirming it, denying it, both affirming and denying it (the seemingly contradictory case), and neither affirming nor denying it. This analytical framework laid the groundwork for exploring the potential meaningfulness of apparent contradictions.

Another precursor to dialetheism in ancient Eastern thought is the Jain theory of anekantavada, or “non-one-sidedness,” developed in the 6th century BCE. This principle asserts that reality is complex and multi-faceted, and that any single viewpoint or statement is inherently limited and potentially contradictory with other perspectives. As such, seemingly contradictory statements could be seen as complementary perspectives on an underlying truth, transcending the limitations of language and conceptual frameworks.

While these Eastern philosophical traditions did not explicitly endorse dialetheism as a formal logical system, their willingness to entertain paradoxical or seemingly contradictory statements as a means of insight or spiritual realization paved the way for the more explicit formulation of dialetheism in modern Western thought.

Dialetheism in the West: A Modern Philosophical Trajectory

The explicit development of dialetheism as a distinct logical and metaphysical position can be traced back to the 20th century, with contributions from various philosophers and logicians. One of the earliest and most influential figures in this regard was the Polish logician Stanisław Jaśkowski, who in the 1940s developed a paraconsistent logic system known as the “discussive” or “discursive” logic. This system aimed to accommodate certain contradictions within a consistent logical framework, challenging the classical principle of explosion (ex contradictione quodlibet), which states that from a contradiction, any proposition can be derived.

However, it was the Australian philosopher Graham Priest who emerged as the most prominent advocate and theorist of dialetheism in the latter half of the 20th century. In his seminal 1979 paper “The Logic of Paradox,” Priest proposed a paraconsistent logic system called “LP” (later developed into the “logic of paradox”), designed to accommodate certain paradoxes and contradictions within a coherent logical framework.

In classical logic, we have a two-valued truth model where a statement is either true or false, and there is no middle ground. However, when we consider dialetheism, we need to modify the inference rules and truth models to accommodate the possibility of true contradictions. In a three-valued logic system, we introduce a third truth value, usually denoted as ‘u’ (unknown or undetermined), alongside true (T) and false (F). The truth tables for logical operations like negation, conjunction, and disjunction are modified to account for this third value. The inference rules in a three-valued logic system are modified to handle the third truth value. For example, the principle of explosion (ex falso quodlibet), which states that any statement follows from a contradiction in classical logic, is no longer valid in a three-valued logic system.

In a four-valued logic system, we introduce a fourth truth value, often denoted as ‘b’ (both true and false), in addition to true (T), false (F), and unknown (u). This fourth value represents the possibility of true contradictions, as allowed by dialetheism. In a four-valued logic system, the inference rules are also modified to handle the additional truth value representing true contradictions. For example, the principle of non-contradiction, which states that a statement and its negation cannot both be true in classical logic, is no longer valid in a four-valued logic system with dialetheism.

Priest’s contributions extended beyond the formal development of paraconsistent logics; he also constructed a comprehensive metaphysical framework for dialetheism, known as “non-classical metaphysics” or “metaphysical dialetheism.” This view holds that reality itself is fundamentally contradictory or “glutty,” containing true contradictions that cannot be eliminated or resolved through traditional logical means.

Dialetheists often cite various paradoxes and conundrums as evidence for the existence of true contradictions, such as the famous Liar Paradox (“This sentence is false”), or the set-theoretical paradoxes encountered in the foundations of mathematics. According to dialetheists, these paradoxes reveal genuine contradictions inherent in language, thought, or the fabric of reality itself, rather than mere linguistic confusions or logical errors.

Philosophical Foundations and Implications

The philosophical foundations of dialetheism rest on several key ideas and arguments that challenge traditional principles of logic and metaphysics. Central to dialetheism is the rejection of the law of non-contradiction. This classical principle states that contradictory statements cannot both be true, formally expressed as ¬(A ? ¬A). Dialetheists argue that there are genuine cases where contradictions of the form (A ? ¬A) can and do occur, and that these contradictions should be accepted as true rather than dismissed or resolved. This bold stance fundamentally challenges the traditional logical framework that has been foundational in Western thought.

Dialetheism is closely tied to the development of paraconsistent logics, which are formal logical systems designed to accommodate contradictory premises without trivializing the entire system. These logics challenge the classical principle of explosion (ex contradictione quodlibet), which states that any conclusion can be derived from a contradiction. In paraconsistent logics, inference rules are modified or restricted to prevent the derivation of arbitrary conclusions from contradictions. For instance, in the classical logic system, from a contradiction (A ? ¬A), any proposition B can be derived: A, ¬A ? B (for any B). However, in a paraconsistent logic like LP (Logic of Paradox), this rule is restricted, preventing the derivation of arbitrary conclusions from contradictions.

Another significant aspect of dialetheism is metaphysical dialetheism, developed by Graham Priest and other proponents. This framework, also known as “non-classical metaphysics,” posits that reality itself is fundamentally contradictory or “glutty,” containing true contradictions that cannot be eliminated or resolved. Formally, this can be expressed as: ?x(Px ? ¬Px), where P represents a property or predicate, and the statement asserts that there exists an entity x that both possesses and does not possess the property P. This perspective challenges the very nature of how we perceive and understand reality, suggesting that contradictions are an inherent part of the fabric of existence.

Dialetheists often point to cases of vagueness and indeterminacy, such as the Sorites paradox (involving the gradual transition from a heap to a non-heap), as examples where contradictory statements may be true. In the “penumbra” region of vagueness, some dialetheists argue that statements like “This is a heap” and “This is not a heap” could both be true for certain borderline cases. This approach highlights the limitations of classical logic in dealing with real-world phenomena that are not easily categorized.

Dialetheism presents a critique of classical logic, challenging the foundations of classical logic, particularly the principle of bivalence (every statement is either true or false) and the law of excluded middle (a statement is either true or its negation is true). Dialetheists argue that these principles are too restrictive and fail to capture the complexity and paradoxical nature of reality. By rejecting these principles, dialetheism opens up new avenues for understanding and interpreting logical and metaphysical issues.

If accepted, dialetheism would represent a seismic shift in the foundations of logic, metaphysics, and rational thought, forcing a re-evaluation of many long-held assumptions and principles. It has significant implications for our understanding of truth, meaning, and the nature of reality itself, challenging us to rethink the very basis of how we conceptualize and engage with the world.

Applications of Dialetheism

Despite its controversial and radical nature, dialetheism and the related development of paraconsistent logics have found various applications and implications across different fields. In the philosophy of logic, dialetheism has led to the creation of paraconsistent logics, which are formal logical systems designed to accommodate contradictory premises without trivializing the entire system. These logics challenge the classical principle of explosion and have practical applications in computer science, artificial intelligence, and the study of vagueness and semantic paradoxes. By providing a framework that can handle inconsistencies, paraconsistent logics enhance our ability to model and reason about complex, real-world scenarios.

In metaphysics and ontology, metaphysical dialetheism, as advocated by Graham Priest, suggests that reality itself may be fundamentally contradictory or “glutty,” containing true contradictions that cannot be eliminated or resolved. This perspective has profound implications for our understanding of existence, identity, and the limits of rational inquiry into the nature of reality. It challenges the traditional metaphysical views that rely on a consistent and non-contradictory foundation, prompting a re-evaluation of how we perceive and describe the world around us.

Dialetheism also impacts the philosophy of language by offering a new way to handle semantic paradoxes, such as the Liar Paradox, which involve self-reference and apparent contradictions. Dialetheists argue that these paradoxes reveal genuine contradictions in natural language and thought, rather than mere logical puzzles. This perspective suggests that natural language is inherently contradictory in some cases, requiring a more flexible approach to understanding and interpreting meaning.

In the philosophy of mathematics, dialetheism has been applied to certain paradoxes and contradictions in set theory, such as Russell’s Paradox. Some dialetheists contend that these paradoxes reveal genuine contradictions in the foundations of mathematics, rather than mere technical problems that can be resolved within classical set theory. This has significant implications for our understanding of the ontological status of mathematical objects and the limits of formalization. It challenges the traditional view of mathematics as a completely consistent and objective discipline.

The philosophy of religion has also seen applications of dialetheism, as it provides a potential framework for understanding and reconciling certain religious paradoxes or seemingly contradictory doctrines. Examples include the paradoxes of the Trinity in Christian theology or the concept of non-duality in Eastern philosophies. By embracing certain contradictions, dialetheism may offer novel insights into the nature of religious mysteries and ineffable truths, providing a more profound and nuanced understanding of theological concepts.

Dialetheism offers a unique perspective on vagueness and indeterminacy, particularly in cases like the Sorites paradox. By allowing for the truth of contradictory statements in “penumbra” regions of vagueness, dialetheism provides a more nuanced understanding of the nature of vagueness and its implications for language and logic. This approach can help resolve longstanding issues related to borderline cases and indeterminate concepts, offering a more flexible and comprehensive view of linguistic and logical phenomena.

Computational applications of paraconsistent logics developed in the context of dialetheism have found significant use in computer science and artificial intelligence. These applications include knowledge representation, reasoning with inconsistent data, and fault-tolerant computing. By enabling systems to handle and process contradictory information without collapsing into triviality, paraconsistent logics enhance the robustness and reliability of computational systems, particularly in environments where inconsistencies are common. These practical applications demonstrate the real-world utility of dialetheistic principles in advancing technology and improving computational methods.

Applications in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence

One of the most promising domains for the practical application of dialetheism and paraconsistent logics is in the field of computer science and artificial intelligence. These disciplines often encounter situations where dealing with inconsistent or contradictory information is essential, and paraconsistent frameworks offer valuable tools for managing and reasoning with such inconsistencies.

In knowledge representation and reasoning, many knowledge-based systems, such as expert systems or semantic networks, face inconsistencies due to incomplete or conflicting information from different sources. Paraconsistent logics provide a framework for representing and reasoning with such inconsistent knowledge bases without trivializing the entire system. For example, in a medical expert system, contradictory information from different diagnostic tests or expert opinions can be handled through paraconsistent reasoning, allowing for more robust and nuanced decision-making.

Database management systems often encounter inconsistent or conflicting data due to errors, updates from multiple sources, or violations of integrity constraints. Paraconsistent logics can be applied to query and manage such inconsistent databases, allowing for meaningful information retrieval and reasoning despite the presence of contradictions. This has applications in areas such as data integration, data cleaning, and handling inconsistencies in big data systems. By employing paraconsistent reasoning, databases can provide more reliable and accurate information even when faced with conflicting data entries.

Fault-tolerant computing is another area where paraconsistent logics show potential. In fault-tolerant computing systems, contradictions or errors may arise due to hardware or software failures. By utilizing paraconsistent reasoning, these systems can continue to operate and produce meaningful outputs even in the presence of contradictory or inconsistent information, enhancing their robustness and reliability. This capability is crucial for maintaining system functionality and ensuring consistent performance despite encountering faults.

In belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning, paraconsistent logics are relevant to belief revision systems, where an agent’s beliefs may need to be updated or revised in the face of new, potentially contradictory information. Paraconsistent frameworks can help manage and resolve such belief revisions in a non-trivial manner, enabling more flexible and adaptive reasoning processes in artificial intelligence systems. This adaptability is essential for AI systems that must continually learn and adjust their knowledge bases.

Natural language processing (NLP) often deals with ambiguities, contradictions, and context-dependent meanings inherent in natural languages. Paraconsistent logics have been explored as a means to handle and reason about the inherent inconsistencies and paradoxes present in natural language, potentially improving the robustness and accuracy of language processing systems, such as machine translation, sentiment analysis, and conversational agents. By incorporating paraconsistent reasoning, NLP systems can better handle the complexities and nuances of human language.

In the semantic web and ontology engineering, paraconsistent logics can be used to manage and reason with potentially inconsistent ontologies or knowledge bases, allowing for more robust and fault-tolerant semantic applications. This has implications for areas such as data integration, ontology alignment, and reasoning over linked data. By applying paraconsistent frameworks, these systems can maintain coherence and provide reliable semantic insights even when faced with conflicting data.

Artificial intelligence planning and reasoning systems can also benefit from paraconsistent logics. In AI planning and reasoning, contradictory or inconsistent information may arise due to incomplete knowledge or dynamically changing environments. Paraconsistent logics enable more robust and flexible decision-making processes, particularly in domains such as robotics, autonomous systems, and real-time planning scenarios. By incorporating paraconsistent reasoning, AI systems can better adapt to and manage unexpected changes and conflicting information.

While the practical implementation and integration of paraconsistent logics into real-world systems often involve significant challenges and ongoing research, their potential applications in computer science and artificial intelligence are vast and promising. As these fields increasingly grapple with the complexities of real-world data and environments, paraconsistent reasoning may offer valuable tools for managing and exploiting inconsistencies in a principled and non-trivial manner.

Criticisms and Objections to Dialetheism

Despite its bold and thought-provoking claims, dialetheism has faced significant criticisms and objections from various philosophers and logicians. One of the most fundamental criticisms is its violation of the law of non-contradiction. This venerable principle, a cornerstone of Western logic and metaphysics since Aristotle, asserts that contradictory statements cannot both be true. Critics argue that accepting true contradictions undermines the very foundations of rational thought and leads to an unacceptable trivialism, where any proposition can be derived from a contradiction, thereby nullifying meaningful discourse and logical analysis.

Another major criticism is the unintelligibility of dialetheism. Some critics argue that it is impossible to truly grasp or comprehend a genuine contradiction. They contend that apparent contradictions are merely indicative of linguistic confusions, conceptual inadequacies, or logical errors, rather than reflecting any deep truth about reality. This perspective suggests that dialetheism fails to provide a coherent and understandable account of contradictions, undermining its philosophical plausibility.

Skeptical consequences are also a significant concern for critics of dialetheism. They argue that if dialetheism is accepted, it opens the door to a radical form of skepticism, where any belief or proposition can be rendered meaningless or contradictory. This could undermine the very possibility of rational inquiry and knowledge acquisition, leading to a nihilistic view of truth and knowledge that destabilizes the foundations of philosophical and scientific inquiry.

Many critics maintain that the semantic and logical paradoxes cited by dialetheists as evidence for true contradictions are merely artifacts of language or formal systems, and do not necessarily reflect genuine contradictions in reality. These paradoxes, they argue, can be resolved or dissolved through careful analysis or reformulations within classical logic. This perspective sees the paradoxes as linguistic puzzles rather than indications of actual contradictions in the world.

The metaphysical implausibility of dialetheism is another point of contention. Critics argue that the idea of a “contradictory reality” or “glutty” ontology proposed by metaphysical dialetheism is implausible and lacks empirical support. They contend that our experience of the world, while complex and often paradoxical, does not necessitate the existence of literal contradictions. This view challenges the metaphysical foundations of dialetheism, asserting that it is out of step with our empirical understanding of reality.

Unnecessary complexity is another criticism leveled against dialetheism. Some critics argue that it introduces unnecessary complexity and complications into logic and metaphysics. They believe that classical logic and the principle of non-contradiction have served us well in scientific inquiry and rational discourse, and that dialetheism is an ad hoc solution to a set of puzzles that can be resolved within classical frameworks. This perspective favors maintaining the traditional logical structures that have proven effective over time.

Critics propose alternative resolutions to the paradoxes and apparent contradictions cited by dialetheists. These alternatives, such as hierarchical or contextualist approaches, aim to preserve classical logic while offering more nuanced explanations for the puzzling cases. By providing these alternative frameworks, critics seek to address the issues raised by dialetheism without abandoning the foundational principles of classical logic.

While these criticisms are formidable, dialetheists have offered various rebuttals and counter-arguments. They maintain that their position offers a more comprehensive and realistic account of truth, language, and reality by embracing certain contradictions rather than attempting to eliminate or resolve them through traditional logical means. This ongoing debate highlights the deep and complex issues at the heart of philosophical inquiry into logic and truth.

Wider Philosophical Implications of Dialetheism

If dialetheism were to gain widespread acceptance, it would have profound and far-reaching implications for various domains of philosophical inquiry and human understanding. One of the most significant impacts would be on rethinking the foundations of logic. Dialetheism would necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the foundations of logic, challenging long-held principles such as the law of non-contradiction, the principle of bivalence, and the law of excluded middle. This could lead to a paradigm shift in how we conceive of and formalize logical reasoning, with potentially revolutionary consequences for fields that rely heavily on classical logic, such as mathematics, computer science, and formal epistemology. The shift might involve developing new logical systems and frameworks that can accommodate contradictions, thereby transforming our approach to logical analysis and problem-solving.

The metaphysical and ontological implications of dialetheism are also profound. If reality itself is deemed to be fundamentally contradictory or “glutty,” as proposed by metaphysical dialetheism, it would have significant implications for our understanding of the nature of existence, identity, and the ontological status of various entities. This perspective could challenge traditional metaphysical concepts and force a re-evaluation of the limits and scope of rational inquiry into the nature of reality. It might lead to a new ontology that embraces contradictions as an inherent aspect of the fabric of existence, thereby altering our philosophical and scientific perspectives on what constitutes reality.

Dialetheism also forces a re-evaluation of traditional notions of truth and meaning. If contradictions can be true, then the classical principles of bivalence (every statement is either true or false) and the law of excluded middle (a statement is either true or its negation is true) may need to be abandoned or revised. This could lead to the development of alternative semantic theories and conceptions of truth that accommodate dialetheia. Such a shift would impact various fields that depend on clear and consistent definitions of truth, prompting new approaches to understanding and communicating meaning.

The acceptance of dialetheism could pose significant epistemological challenges for the theory of knowledge. If contradictions are deemed to be true, it raises questions about the coherence and consistency of belief systems, the reliability of rational inquiry, and the nature of justification and warrant. Epistemologists may need to develop novel frameworks for knowledge acquisition and belief revision that can accommodate true contradictions. This would involve rethinking the criteria for knowledge and how we assess the validity of beliefs in light of contradictory evidence.

Dialetheism has direct implications for the philosophy of language, particularly in how we understand and handle semantic paradoxes, self-reference, and the relationship between language and reality. It could lead to a re-evaluation of the nature of meaning, reference, and the limits of natural language in capturing the complexities of reality. By accommodating contradictions, philosophers of language might develop new theories that better reflect the intricacies and paradoxes inherent in linguistic and conceptual frameworks.

In the realm of religious and mystical interpretations, dialetheism has been explored as a potential framework for understanding and reconciling certain religious paradoxes or seemingly contradictory doctrines. If embraced by religious thinkers and mystics, dialetheism could offer novel interpretations of religious mysteries, paradoxical teachings, and the ineffable nature of divine truths. This perspective might enrich theological discourse by providing new ways to engage with and interpret complex spiritual concepts.

The acceptance of true contradictions could also have implications for artistic and literary perspectives. It could open up new avenues for exploring paradoxes, ambiguities, and the transcendence of conventional logical constraints. Artists and writers may find dialetheism a fertile ground for exploring the limits of language and representation, and for challenging traditional notions of coherence and meaning. This could lead to innovative forms of expression that embrace and highlight the paradoxical nature of human experience.

Ethical and moral implications are another area where dialetheism could have a significant impact. It might influence how we understand and resolve moral dilemmas or seemingly contradictory ethical principles. Dialetheism could force a re-evaluation of the foundations of moral reasoning and the coherence of ethical frameworks in the face of true contradictions. This could lead to new approaches in ethical theory that acknowledge and address the complexity and often paradoxical nature of moral decisions.

While these wider implications are speculative and subject to ongoing philosophical debate, they highlight the far-reaching and potentially transformative impact that dialetheism could have on various domains of human thought and inquiry. Whether dialetheism ultimately gains widespread acceptance or remains a provocative minority position, it has undoubtedly challenged long-held assumptions and sparked important discussions about the nature of truth, language, and the limits of rational inquiry.

Dialetheism stands as a bold and controversial theory that dares to embrace contradictions as a fundamental aspect of reality. While its proponents argue that it offers a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of truth, language, and existence, its critics contend that it undermines the foundations of rational thought and leads to unacceptable consequences. Regardless of one’s stance, dialetheism has undoubtedly sparked important debates and ongoing research into the nature of logic, metaphysics, and the boundaries of human understanding. As we continue to grapple with paradoxes, inconsistencies, and the complexities of the world around us, dialetheism remains a provocative and thought-provoking perspective that challenges us to rethink the very foundations of rational inquiry.

Further Reading

Dialetheism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Paraconsistent Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Logic Search (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Being ‘interesting’ is Not an Objective Feature of the World

carina-nebula

Colour-composite image of the Carina Nebula. Courtesy ESO

Lorraine L Besser | Aeon Ideas

Most of us know and value pleasant experiences. We savour the taste of a freshly picked strawberry. We laugh more than an event warrants, just because laughing feels good. We might argue about the degree to which such pleasant experiences are valuable, and the extent to which they ought to shape our lives, but we can’t deny their value.

So pleasant experiences are necessarily valuable, but are there also valuable experiences that are not necessarily pleasant? It seems there are. Often, we have experiences that captivate us, that we cherish even though they are not entirely pleasant. We read a novel that leads us to feel both horror and awe. We binge-watch a TV show that explores the shocking course of moral corruption of someone who could be your neighbour, friend, even your spouse. The experience is both painful and horrifying, but we can’t turn it off.

These experiences seem intuitively valuable in the same way that pleasant experiences are intuitively valuable. But they are not valuable because they are pleasant – rather, they are valuable by virtue of being interesting.

What does it mean for an experience to be interesting? First, to say that something is interesting is to describe what the experience feels like to the person undergoing it. This is the phenomenological quality of the experience. When we study the phenomenology of something, we examine what it feels like, from the inside, to experience that thing. For instance, most of us would describe eating our favourite foods as a pleasurable experience: the food itself isn’t pleasurable, but the experience of eating it is. Similarly, when we talk about something being beautiful or awe-inspiring, we aren’t describing the thing itself, but rather our experience of it. We see the sunset and feel moved by it; the beauty is something we experience. Likewise the awe it inspires is a feature of our experiential reaction to it. The interesting is just like this. It is a feature of our experiential reaction, of our engagement.

We don’t always use the word ‘interesting’ in this way. In ordinary language, we often describe the objects of experience as interesting. We talk about interesting books, interesting people, and so on. When we say that a book is interesting, we more likely mean that the experience of reading the book is interesting. It just doesn’t make sense to describe a book to be objectively interesting, independently of people experiencing it as interesting. How could a book be interesting without being read? And if a book is objectively interesting, shouldn’t we all find it interesting? We don’t all find the same things to be interesting. It is a common experience for something to be interesting to one person, yet not another. So while we might describe objects as interesting, we should recognise that this is a loose, and shorthand, way to describe what’s really interesting – our experience of them.

Another way in which we use the word ‘interesting’ is in the context of describing what a person is interested in: John is interested in Second World War novels, for example. This usage also differs from what I’m describing as the ‘interesting’. It describes a particular fit between one’s interests and the objects of one’s experiences. But notice that fitting with your interests, and being interested in something, is actually a different experience to finding something interesting. We’ve all been interested in things that turn out to be boring, and we’ve all found experiences interesting when we had no prior interest in them. The interesting is thus not an objective feature of an object, nor an experience that necessarily aligns or follows from your interests. It is rather a feature of our experiences.

To say that something is interesting is also to describe a particular kind of synthesis that arises within the experience. Whenever we engage in an activity, we bring to that experience some combination of expectations, likes/desires, beliefs, curiosity, and so forth. This package contributes to the activity delivering a particular subjective experience. There is a synthesis, specific to the individual’s engagement, that determines what her experience feels like – its phenomenological quality. It is within this synthesis that a person finds an experience interesting, or not. There is no one synthesis that makes an experience interesting. Sometimes, a clash of expectations and reality makes something interesting, sometimes someone’s curiosity allows one to notice features that make an activity interesting, and so on. Because the interesting lies within a synthesis between the individual and an activity, one individual can find something interesting (say, reading philosophy) that another person doesn’t.

The synthesis is complex, unique to the subject and the experience – and, in the end, unspecifiable. This is why we tend to overlook the interesting as a valuable feature of our experiences. Pleasure, by contrast, is a fairly uniform feature of experience. We know exactly what others are talking about when they talk about pleasurable experiences, and can relate to that experience in a personal way – even if it is something that we have not experienced as pleasurable. Our reactions to the experiences that others find interesting are often different. John finds reading Second World War novels to be an ongoing source of interest, yet Julia can’t imagine a more boring way of spending her time, and can’t understand how anyone would find them interesting. In such scenarios, we are more likely to discredit the value of John’s experience than to try to understand and appreciate it. Because the interesting is by nature a more complicated, harder-to-reach, harder-to-describe feature than others, we rarely stop to think about just what the interesting is.

While wrapping our head around the interesting might be challenging, it is important to acknowledge the value intrinsic to interesting experiences. Recognising it as valuable validates those who choose to pursue the interesting, and also opens up a new dimension of value that can enrich our lives. Most of us know there is more to life than pleasure, yet it is all too easy to choose our experiences for the sake of pleasure. For many of us, though, interesting experiences are more rewarding than pleasurable experiences, insofar as their intrinsic value is a product of multifaceted aspects of our engagement. Interesting experiences spark the mind in a way that stimulates and lingers. They can also be easy to come by – sometimes just a sense of curiosity is needed to make an activity interesting. Look around, feel the pull, and cherish the interesting.Aeon counter – do not remove

Lorraine L Besser

This article was originally published at Aeon and has been republished under Creative Commons.